(Pseudo)probleme conceptuale ale lingvisticii lui Noam Chomsky

False Conceptual Problems of Noam Chomsky's Linguistics

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Abstract:
The article focuses on some kinds of arguments brought by some of late Wittgenstein's interprets against Chomsky's linguistics. The Wittgensteinian interprets provide a radical critique directed against the conceptual frame of chomskyan linguistics, based on some assumptions of the Ordinary Language Philosophy. Some of the concepts used by American linguist (."such as "rule" or "faculty") do not fit with the ordinary concepts, and, for Wittgensteinian interprets, Chomsky's theory is nonsensical. In answer to these strong claims, I tried to show that it's not always clear what is the correct and incorrect use of some concepts such as "rule ", and this fact makes hardly applicable the frame of the Ordinary Language Philosophy in this particular case. On the other hand, Chomsky tried to develop a scientific theory, and the concepts of the scientific theories do not always "fit" with the ordinary language; for example, the use of the word "force" in Newton '." theory is not the same with the ordinary use of "force". In conclusion, the arguments against Chomsky linguistics based on the ordinary language are radical, but weak.